Amir Taheri: differenze tra le versioni

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→‎The Unknown Life of the Shah: Possibili modifiche.
Riga 100:
:''Determined to revive Iran's "Aryan" past, the army created by Reza Khan in 1921 considered it a duty to purge the Persian language of as many borrowed Arabic words as possible. The result was a "pure" vocabulary that was, at times, totally incomprehensible to most average Iranians.'' (p. 27)
 
*Reza Scià non fu ateo, e potrebbe essere meglio definito come un agnostico. Fu, per un periodo, affascinato dagli insegnamenti di Zoroastro, il profeta pre-islamico dell'Iran, ma questo interesse dovrebbe essere compreso nel contestoquadro del suo sogno di vecchio soldato di riportare l'Iran al suo antico splendore. Mohammad Reza, viceversa, era profondamente religioso, al punto di negare ogni libero arbitro.
:''Reza Shah was not an atheist and could best be described as an agnostic. He was, for a while, fascinated by the teachings of Zoroaster, Iran's pre-Islamic prophet, but his fascination should be understood in the context of his old soldier's dream of restoring Iran to its ancient grandeur. Mohammad-Reza, on the other hand, was deeply religious, even to the point of rejecting all free will.'' (p. 31)
 
Riga 109:
:''Reza Shah had been a powerful leader only partly because of his position, and Mohammad-Reza was fully conscious of the fact that he had few of his father's natural assets. The new Shah had received a democratic training which meant that he knew that there were different views on every issue and that reality could be contemplated from many different angles: this made him hesitant and indecisive where his father had been determined and resolute. Mohammad-Reza wanted to be loved for his person: Reza Shah never knew what love was, asking only to be obeyed. The new Shah was polite and shy and anxious not to offend: the old Shah deliberately terrorised members of his entourage in order to keep them constantly on their guard. Reza Shah had been a born leader; the new Shah had to learn to become one.'' (pp. 63-64)
 
*Lo Scià stesso non era a suo agio nel ruolo del martire. La sua personalità favorivaprediligeva gli atti di eroismo. Voleva essere un vincitore, come lo era stato nei tornei sportivi scolastici a Lucerna. La sua formazione europea gli impediva di capire la psicologia del suo propriostesso popolo. Non sapeva che i persiani istintivamente sospettavano e detestavano il forte, il vincitore e l'eroe. Obbedirono a Reza Scià ma non lo amarono mai: ora amavano Mohammad Reza Scià, ma non volevano obbedirgli. La repulsione quasi patologica che lo Scià aveva per ciò che considerava «sporca politica» gli impediva di capire la necessità – per non dire la legittimità – di blandire almeno in parte i pregiudizi popolari.
:''The Shah himself was uncomfortable in the role of the martyr. His character favoured acts of heroism. He wanted to be a winner, as he had been at the school sports tournaments at Lucerne. His European education prevented him from understanding the psychology of his own people. He did not know that the Persians instinctively suspected and disliked the strong, the winner and the hero. They obeyed Reza Shah but never loved him: now they loved Mohammad-Reza Shah but did not wish to obey him. The Shah's almost pathological dislike for what he saw as "filthy politics" prevented him from understanding the necessity – not to say the legitimacy – of flattering at least a part of popular prejudices.'' (p. 70)
 
*[[Mohammad Mossadeq|Mossadeq]] faceva ridere e piangere le folle. Confermava i loro pregiudizi e le loro superstizioni e lusingava le loro vanità – erano, nella maggior parte dei casi, tutto ciò che rimaneva loro. Lo amavano, ma lui le amava? Nessuno potrebbe saperlo con sicurezzacertezza.
:''Mossadeq made the crowds laugh and cry. He confirmed their prejudices and superstitions and flattered their vanities – they were, in most cases, all they had left. They loved him, but did he love them? No one could know for sure.'' (p. 123)
 
Riga 118:
:''As queen, Farah achieved almost immediate popularity. She had several features that pleased the Iranians: she was "fully Iranian" and also worthy of honour because she descended from the family of the Prophet. She was a brunette with deep black eyes of the kind most Persians cherish. (The Shah's outlandish taste for blondes was not shared by his compatriots.) Farah appeared to be slightly taller than the Shah, but this could not be held against her. The new queen's athletic physique and her well-publicised love of sports disconcerted some religious circles, but even the more conservative Iranians now understood that times were changing.'' (p. 162)
 
*La visione dello Scià della forma ideale di governo non era molto lontana da quella di Mossadeq. In quel modello ideale un solo uomo, il re, primo ministro o Pishva [Führer] avrebbe agitofunto come ilda guardiano dei più alti interessi della nazione. Il Pishva, poiché ama il suo popolo, non avrebbe mai potuto fare nulla che potesse essere dannoso per il popolo e il paese. Avrebbe potuto sacrificare gli interessi dei pochi a beneficio di molti. Ma non avrebbe mai nuociuto "al popolo" o "alla nazione" nel suo complesso. La versione di Mossadeq dello stesso modello immaginava un ruolo per le masse, per i gruppi politici – ma non per i partiti politici – e le associazioni religiose, la cui funzione era di sostenere il Pishva lottando contro i suoi avversari e facendolo sentire amato e stimato. Nel modello dello Scià, le decisioni del Pishva dovevano essere eseguite esclusivamente attraverso la burocrazia, con le forze armate sempre pronte a schiacciare qualsiasi opposizione. Tutto ciò che restava da fare "alla nazione" era di applaudire il Pishva e farlo sentir bene. Mossadeq e lo Scià avanzavano esattamente la stessa argomentazione in difesa dei loro rispettivi modelli : l'essere l'Iran costantemente preda dell'appetito diabolico delle rapaci potenze straniere, l'influenza degli ajnabi (stranieri), moltiplicando i centri di potere politico, avrebbe permesso agli ajnabi di infiltrarsi nelle strutture della nazione. Nessuno dei due poteva immaginare una situazione in cui diversi settori della società iraniana avrebbero potuto, per ragioni proprie, opporsi al Leader. Non potevano concepire una qualsiasi circostanza in cui un movimento d'opposizione avrebbe potuto emergere senza il sostegno o l'intrigo straniero.
:''The Shah's vision of the ideal form of government was not so far removed from that of Mossadeq. In that ideal model one man, the king, prime minister or Pishva [Führer] would act as the guardian of the nation's highest interests. The Pishva, because he loves his people, could never do anything that might not be good for the people and the country. He might sacrifice the interests of the few for the benefit of the many. But he would never harm "the people" or "the nation" as a whole. Mossadeq's version of the same model envisaged a role for crowds, political groups – though not for political parties – and religious associations whose task was to support the Pishva by fighting his opponents and making him feel loved and cherished. In the Shah's model, the Pishva's decisions were to be carried out exclusively through the bureaucracy with the armed forces always ready to crush any opposition. All that was left for "the nation" to do was applaud the Pishva and make him feel good. Mossadeq and the Shah advanced exactly the same argument in defence of their respective models: Iran, being constantly prey to the devilish appetite of the rapacious foreign powers, the influence of the ajnabi (foreigners), multiplying the centres of political power would allow the ajnabi to infiltrate the nation's structures. Neither man could invisage a situation in which different sections of the Iranian society might, for reasons of their own, oppose the Leader. They could conceive of no circumstances in which an opposition movement could emerge without foreign backing and intrigue.'' (p. 168)