Amir Taheri: differenze tra le versioni
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Riga 63:
:''Poetry interprets the chaos of human life and tries to bestow meaning on it. Without imagination there could be no poetry; and imagination chained by ideology produces only propaganda.''<ref name="dictatespoetry"/>
*Malgrado gli sforzi di mascherare il suo odio per
:''Despite efforts to disguise his hatred of Israel in Islamic terms [...] Khamenei is more influenced by Western-style anti-Semitism than by classical Islam's checkered relations with Jews. His argument about territories becoming "irrevocably Islamic" does not wash, if only because of its inconsistency. He has nothing to say about vast chunks of former Islamic territory, including some that belonged to Iran for millennia, now under Russian rule. Nor is he ready to embark on Jihad to drive the Chinese out of Xinjiang, a Muslim ''khanate'' until the late 1940s. Israel, which in terms of territory accounts for one per cent of Saudi Arabia, is a very small fry. Khamenei's shedding of tears for "the sufferings of Palestinian Muslims" are also unconvincing. To start with, not all Palestinians are Muslims. And, if it were only Muslim sufferers who deserved sympathy, why doesn't the "Supreme Guide" beat his chest about the Burmese Rohingya and the Chechens massacred and enchained by Vladimir Putin, not to mention Muslims daily killed by fellow-Muslims across the globe?''<ref>{{en}} [http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/6263/khamenei-israel-palestine ''The Ayatollah's Plan for Israel and Palestine''], ''Gatestone Institute.org'', 31 luglio 2015.</ref>
Riga 69:
:''Khamenei is certainly better educated than the late Khomeini. At least he can speak and write correct Persian and Arabic, something the late Ayatollah never managed. From available evidence Khamenei also has a better knowledge of Islam and its history than Khomeini did. Nevertheless, Khamenei has never been accepted as a theologian or Islamic scholar, but as a political leader, bestowing on him a degree of dangerous ambiguity. That ambiguity enables him to hit much higher than his weight by using his political position as long as the going is good. However, the slightest sign that his political power may be on the wane or seriously challenged could expose him as a prophet without armor. And that, in the context of Iran's violent politics, created of the same substance as angels or not, is a dicey situation to be in, to say the least.''<ref>{{en}} Da [http://english.aawsat.com/2015/08/article55344963/the-supreme-guide-and-the-substance-of-the-angels ''The Supreme Guide and the Substance of the Angels''], ''Ashraq Al-Awsat'', 31 agosto 2015.</ref>
*La Siria attuale mi ricorda un orfano circondato da
:''Syria these days reminds me of an orphan surrounded by real enemies and false friends, forming a club of cynics, and trying to seize control of its destiny.''<ref name=cynics>{{en}} Da ''[http://english.aawsat.com/2015/09/article55345155/opinion-the-syrian-orphan-and-a-club-of-cynics Opinion: The Syrian Orphan and a Club of Cynics]'', ''Ashraq Al-Awsat'', 18 settembre 2015.</ref>
*Il nucleo della tragedia della Siria
:''The core of the Syrian tragedy consists of the fact that Assad and ISIS represent the two faces of the same coin. Both want the Syrian people, or what is left of them inside the country, scripted out of the equation. Both have enough of a popular base to hang on for some more time even if they did not receive succor from the outside which they regularly do. At the same time neither is strong enough or is ever likely to have the popular base to impose its agenda on Syria.''<ref name=cynics/>
*Khomeyni era uno dei circa duecento ayatollah e non fu mai considerato dagli altri come "supremo" in nulla. La sua limitata conoscenza della teologia e della storia e la sua incapacità di padroneggiare il persiano e l'arabo
:''Khomeini was one of some 200 Ayatollahs and never considered by others as "supreme" in anything. His limited knowledge of theology and history and his inability to master Persian and Arabic at a high level meant he would never attain the summit within the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy. Khomeini was a politician and owed his place in the Iranian panorama to the success of his political movement against various rivals and adversaries.''<ref>{{en}} Da [http://english.aawsat.com/2017/03/article55369052/iran-khamenei-debate-starts ''Iran after Khamenei: the Debate Starts''], ''Ashraq Al-Awsat'', 10 marzo 2017.</ref>
Riga 81:
===''The Unknown Life of the Shah''===
*Lo Scià definì la modernizzazione dell'Iran come il principale obiettivo della sua vita, eppure rifiutava categoricamente di vedere che non ci poteva essere nessuna
:''The Shah described the modernisation of Iran as the principal goal of his life, and yet he adamantly refused to see that there could be no veritable modernisation without democracy. He often referred to his Swiss education as part of his credentials as a profoundly committed democrat, but was, at the same time, convinced that Iran was not yet ripe for democracy, and that it was his duty as "the father of the nation" to save the Iranians from a slothful life of prayer, pilgrimage, small commerce, backward farming and cottage industry. He also wanted to turn Iran into a second Japan, make her one of the five or six major world powers by the end of the century. He regarded himself as the custodian of Iran's grandeur and freedom and in later years he extended his self-proclaimed mission of saving Iran to include the entire world.'' (p. 4)
*Più di un decenno dopo la morte dello Scià, non è più necessario essere pro o contro di lui su tutti i temi. Come si potrebbe essere pro o contro tutto ciò che succese durante un regno di quasi trentotto anni? Come potevano gli iraniani non sostenerlo quando
:''More than a decade after the Shah's death it is no longer necessary to be for or against him on all matters. How could one be for or against everything that happened during a reign of nearly thirty-eight years? How could Iranians not be for him when he fought over Azerbaijan or when he gave the royal assent to the bill that nationalised Iran's oil? How could one be against the principle of land reform or the enhancement of women's status? And did he not deserve support when he fought for a more just system of production and pricing for oil, which he called 'a noble substance'? But how could anyone be for him when he closed all doors on discussion and debate and effectively drove many intelligent and patriotic Iranians into the arms of reactionary mullahs? And how could one approve of the unchecked intervention of the SAVAK secret police in virtually all aspects of life, especially in the 1970s? Last but not least, it would be difficult to understand, much less to justify, his almost pathological belief that only the major powers were capable of either protecting or destabilising his regime.'' (p. 5)
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