Amir Taheri: differenze tra le versioni

:''Few cultures hold the written and printed word in so much awe as Muslims, even though the vast majority are illiterate. When a Muslim wants to clinch an argument he says, '"It is written.'"''<ref name="scapegoat"/>

:''Yes, Afghanistan is composed of 18 different communities marked by ethnic, linguistic and religious differences. But ask any Afghan who he is, and he won't hesitate to reply: an Afghan! The national identity has taken shape over 300 years — after all, as a state, Afghanistan is older than America, Germany and Italy. It is also one of the oldest Muslim nation-states.''<ref>{{en}} Da [http://nypost.com/2009/10/15/myths-of-our-afghanistan-debate/ ''"Myths of our Afghanistan debate"''], ''NYPost.com'', 15 ottobre 2009.</ref>

*Per anni, ogni volta che videvo [[Hosni Mubarak|Mubarak]], mi ricordava una mummia. Passava parecchio tempo ogni giorno a "prepararsi". Questo significava tingersi i capelli e le sopracciglia in nero corvino, ed imbellettarsi le guance per renderle più rosee, più o meno nello stesso modo in cui i mummificatori egiziani facevano con i faraoni morti. Indossava anche i tacchi per sembrare più alto e utilizzava un corsetto per tirarsi dentro la pancia. Malgrado la vista in declino, rifiutava gli occhiali in pubblico. Anche a ottanta anni voleva apparire vivace e giovane, proprio come avevano fatto i faraoni. I tentativi di Mubarak di assicurarsi la gioventù eterna erano leggermente comici e in fin dei conti innocui. Ciò che non fu comico e certamente non innocuo fu la mummificazione del suo regime.

:''For years, whenever I saw Mubarak, he reminded me of a mummy. He spent a considerable time each day to “prepare” himself. That meant dying his hair and eyebrows jet black, and applying rouge to his cheeks to make them look rosy, in more or less the same way Egyptian mummy makers did with dead pharaohs. He also wore heels to look taller and used a corset to keep his belly in. Despite declining eyesight, he shunned glasses in public. Even in his 80s, he wanted to appear alive and young, just as pharaohs had done. Mubarak’sMubarak's attempts at securing eternal youth were faintly comical and ultimately harmless. What was not comical and certainly harmless was the mummification of his regime.''<ref>{{en}} Da [http://nypost.com/2011/02/13/curse-of-the-mummy/ "''Curse of the mummy"''], ''NYPost.com'', 13 febbraio 2011.</ref>

:''The Arab League was a British colonial creation to perpetuate despotic regimes in the context of the Cold War. The world has changed since then, and new Iraq could become a symbol of that change. Apart from a few thousand bureaucrats, nobody wants the Arab League.''<ref>{{en}} Da ''[http://nypost.com/2011/04/19/a-league-of-despots/ "A league of despots"]'', ''NYPost.com'', 19 aprile 2011.</ref>

*Assad sembra essersi deciso ad epurare il suo governo di chiunque sia remotamente sospettato di simpatizzare per la rivolta democratica -– con la sua prima priorità essendo la ripresa del controllo delle forze armate. Per rendersi chiaro, sta apparendo sulla televisione di Stato in uniforme militare nel suo ruolo di commandantecomandante in capo -– spesso con il petto ricoperto delle più alte decorazioni militari siriane al valore, anche se non ha mai fatto il servizio militare.

:''Assad appears to have decided to purge his government of anyone remotely suspected of sympathizing with the pro-democracy uprising — with his first priority being to reassert control of the armed forces. To hammer that home, he’she's appearing on state TV in military uniforms in his role as commander-in-chief — his chest often covered with Syria’sSyria's highest military decorations for bravery, although he’she's never done military service.''<ref>{{en}} Da [http://nypost.com/2011/08/12/the-lonely-dictator/ "''The lonely dictator"''], ''NYPost.com'', 12 agosto 2011.</ref>

:''Liberated, Iraq is the only Arab country, so far, to have changed governments three times through elections and also the only one where all political parties operate freely. Iraqis didn’tdidn't achieve what they hoped; they achieved what they could. The invasion was not about the United States setting up bases or stealing Iraq’sIraq's oil or using Iraq for an invasion of Iran, as [[Saddam Hussein|Saddam]]’s's apologists claimed. Nor was it about imposing democracy by force. It was about two things: stopping a time bomb that was ticking in the heart of the region and removing the impediment to democratization that was Saddam’sSaddam's regime. More than a million Americans fought and worked in Iraq. They share part of the credit for the fact that Iraqis today are able to run their own lives without fear. They can be proud that, once again, American power was used to free a nation from tyranny.''<ref>{{en}} Da [http://nypost.com/2013/03/19/what-saddams-ouster-achieved/ "''What Saddam’sSaddam's ouster achieved"''], ''NYPost.com'', 19 marzo 2013.</ref>

:''If we regard Iran as a nation, there is no reason it shouldn’tshouldn't have correct relations with the United States or any other country. Decades of opinion polls show that a majority of Iranians have a good opinion of America. But Iran today suffers from a split personality: It is both a nation and, as the Islamic Republic, also a messianic cause. And the Islamic Republic of Iran, far from being part of the solution, is at the root of the conflict tearing the Middle East apart.''<ref>{{en}} Da ''Have the Mullah's Abandoned their Dreams of Empire?'', ''Elaph.com'', 16 novembre 2014.</ref>

:''When I asked Bhutto what he thought of Assad, he described the Syrian leader as “The"The Levanter.”" Knowing that, like himself, I was a keen reader of thrillers, the Pakistani Prime Minister knew that I would get the message. However, it was only months later when, having read Eric Ambler's 1972 novel The Levanter that I understood Bhutto's one-word pen portrayal of Hafez Al-Assad. In The Levanter the hero, or anti-hero if you prefer, is a British businessman who, having lived in Syria for years, has almost “gone"gone native”native" and become a man of uncertain identity. He is a bit of this and a bit of that, and a bit of everything else, in a region that is a mosaic of minorities. He doesn't believe in anything and is loyal to no one. He could be your friend in the morning but betray you in the evening. He has only two goals in life: to survive and to make money [...] Today, Bashar Al-Assad is playing the role of the son of the Levanter, offering his services to any would-be buyer through interviews with whoever passes through the corner of Damascus where he is hiding. At first glance, the Levanter may appear attractive to those engaged in sordid games. In the end, however, the Levanter must betray his existing paymaster in order to begin serving a new one. Four years ago, Bashar switched to the Tehran-Moscow axis and is now trying to switch back to the Tel-Aviv-Washington one that he and his father served for decades. However, if the story has one lesson to teach, it is that the Levanter is always the source of the problem, rather than part of the solution. ISIS is there because almost half a century of repression by the Assads produced the conditions for its emergence. What is needed is a policy based on the truth of the situation in which both Assad and ISIS are parts of the same problem.''<ref>{{en}} Da [http://www.aawsat.net/2015/02/article55341622/opinion-like-father-like-son ''Opinion: Like Father, Like Son''], ''Ashraq Al-Awsat'', 20 febbraio 2015.</ref>

*Malgrado gli sforzi di mascherare il suo odio per l'Israele in termini islamici [...] Khamenei è più influenzato dall'anti-semitismo di stile occidentale che dalle relazioni burrascose con gli ebrei dell'Islam classico. La sua tesi su come i territori diventino "irrevocabilmente islamici" non convince, non fosse altro che per la sua incoerenza. Non ha niente da dire sui vasti pezzi di ex-territorio islamico, inclusi alcuni che appartennero all'Iran per millenni, ora governati dalla Russia. Non è nemmeno pronto a intraprendere la Jihad per cacciare i cinesi via dallo Xinjiang, un khanato musulmano fino all'ultima parte degli anni quaranta. Israele, che in termini territoriali, rappresenta solo l'uno per cento dell'Arabia Saudita, non ha molta rilevanza. Le lacrime versate da Khamenei per "le sofferenze dei musulmani palestinesi" sono anch'esse poco convincenti. Tanto per cominciare, non tutti i palestinesi sono musulmani. E, se fossero solo i sofferenti musulmani che meritano solidarietà, come mai la "guida suprema" non si scandalizza per i Rohingya della Birmania e i ceceni massacrati e incatenati da Vladimir Putin, per non dire dei musulmani uccisi quotidianamente da altri musulmani in tutto il mondo?